Monday, January 14, 2013

A generic argument for mild realism: why 'real magic' is not real


Consider the following quote by Lee Siegel, as cited at various occasions by Daniel Dennett (for example here):

"I'm writing a book on magic." I explain, and I'm asked, "Real magic?" By real magic people mean miracles, thaumaturgical acts, and supernatural powers. "No." I answer: "Conjuring tricks, not real magic." Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic.

This short dialog reflects an important feature of our conceptual capacities as human beings that seems to be the source of some wide-spread confusions: We can conceive of things that are impossible. In fact, we can conceive of things as impossible, i.e. we are capable of entertaining concepts that are essentially - by definition - impossible. Confusion arises when we take their conceivability as evidence for the claim that they are real or possible or that they exist. All too often, it seems, we take the conceivability of X to support some sort of naïve  realism about X.

If we look at the dialog as exploring the concept of 'magic', addressing the question "What does 'real magic' refer to?", the puzzling conclusion that 'real magic' is not real and the magic that is real is 'not real magic' becomes much less puzzling. It simply means that people's concept of 'real magic' involves some necessary, 'magical' ingredient, something that is not actually possible. On that reading, we can rephrase the dialog as follows:

I'm writing a book on magic.
- Do you mean the kind of magic that is not possible?

No. Conjuring tricks, not the kind that is impossible.

The question "Real magic?", then, reflects the kind of naïve  realism described above: naïve  realism about magic. It is based on (and coherent only in conjunction with) the assumption that 'real magic' exist, despite the fact that this is conceptually impossible because the very concept of 'real magic' implies non-existence. So what? Not many people believe in 'real magic' anyways! Maybe not. But what about other allegedly 'magical' concepts, such as consciousness or free will?

Most people believe that consciousness is real. In fact, some people claim that their immediate conscious state is the only the thing they can be certain of. At the same time many people are inclined to reject a priori any explanation of how consciousness works as incomplete at best, because they believe that there is something 'magical' and inherently unintelligible about consciousness. In other words, they are naïve  realists about consciousness, endorsing the claim that it is a real phenomenon, while retaining the ‘magical’ component that makes it unintelligible.

If we reject the position of naïve realism as incoherent, are we necessarily anti-realists, do we have to deny the existence of things like consciousness? Daniel Dennett, for one, claims that we don’t, proposing a form of mild realism about consciousness, which holds that consciousness is real, that it can, in principle, be fully explained, and that any intuitions to the contrary are a function of the conceptual defect described above. Consciousness, he argues, is real if the concept is stripped of its necessarily incoherent ‘magical’ component and it is identified with or reduced to certain biological processes, which are real. More generally, then, mild realism about X is really realism about X-as-Y; it is essentially the negation of the claim that X is anything over and above Y and Y is real. For example, Dennett's mild realism about consciousness is equivalent to realism about consciousness-as-neurophysiology, which in turn is equivalent to realism about particular biological processes conjoined with the identification of consciousness with, or its reduction to, those processes. In other words, mild realism about X is the claim that X is, or is reducible to, Y, and Y is real. This said, consider the following adaptation of our initial example:

I've built a machine that has consciousness.
-Real consciousness?

No. Biological processes, not real consciousness.

Real consciousness
, in other words, refers to the consciousness that is not real, while the consciousness that is real, that actually exists, is not real consciousness.

Or more generically:

X.
-Real X?

No. Y, not real X.

Real X
, in other words, refers to the X that is not real, while the X that is real, that actually exists (as Y), is not real X.

This approach not only provides a neat way out of the confusions about reconciling 'magical' concepts with an explanatorily adequate scientific world view. It also points to a promising 'division of labor' between philosophy and the empirical sciences: finding meaningful empirical explanations for ‘not real magic’, such as consciousness, requires the conceptual demystification of common-sense explananda, which remains an inherently philosophical task.

2 comments:

Magz said...

"In other words, mild realism about X is the claim that X is, or is reducible to, Y, and Y is real"

Isnt the case rather that X is not reducable (since the magical component isnt reducible) to Y and it is Y that exists and not X, making the mild realism of X into not a realism of X at all.

Can we actually say that: yep you are right unicorns do exist, but they dont have a horn in their face and their tail isnt a rainbow but hair?

Till said...

Interesting. I'm guessing this is you Magnus? =) With 'magical component' I was actually referring to a property like 'does-not-exist' or 'is-not-real', not necessarily to non-reducibility. So on that reading, mild realism about X is realism about X-reanalyzed, where the reanalysis merely involves taking away the non-existence property. In that sense mild realism is the claim that the original concept that involves the non-existence property is flawed and that nothing informative is lost by reanalyzing it. Still, this is merely a claim at this point, but I guess history of science provides a lot of examples of that process (e.g. where vitalism about biological life was replaced by a sober, non-magical biological view).

With regard to unicorns - I guess what I would say is that mild realism about unicorns would be the claim that, if such creatures were discovered, we should accept them as 'unicorns' even though they clearly do exist and thus don't fit the original concept. That is, mild realism about unicorns would suggest that we do away with the non-existence property and keep the rest. The rest could still be non-existent, but it wouldn't necessarily be. Does that address your point at all?